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One of the interesting historical aspects of legislation regulating the distribution
of corporate securities and the trading in such securities by dealers and investors is
the frequency with which it is re-examined and reassessed. The swiftness of industrial
and economic change in free societies such as the United States and the countries
of Western Europe makes reappraisal of the effects of securities legislation a recurring necessity. In England, the Companies Act, which contains the requirement
for the use of prospectuses in the sale of securities to the public and prescribes the
information to be contained in such prospectuses, has been revised in our own generation in 1929 and i947.1 Since 1959 it has also been the subject of a study and
report by a committee (known as the Jenkins Committee in honor of its chairman,
Lord Jenkins) appointed by the Board of Trade.2 Our own legislation-the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934-has been reviewed in 194o
and 1941 (no legislative action was then taken) and in 1954 when substantial amendments were made to the Securities Act of 1933. In 1961 Congress directed the
Commission to make a study of the nation's securities markets and to report the
results of its study, including any recommendations which the Commission felt were
desirable.4 The Commission organized a separate staff to conduct the study. The
results of such study are now embodied in a four-part Report of Special Study of
Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission.5
" This article bears a date of May 15, 1964.
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Curiously, both the Jenkins Committee and the Special Study deal extensively
with the possibility of coalescing the dissemination of information concerning corporations, their businesses and their securities, to investors, whether in connection with
a distribution by the corporation itself (or its controlling stockholders), which would
be subject to the prospectus requirements of the Companies Act, or the registration
and prospectus requirements of the Securities Act, or in connection with other
distributions of, or trading in, already outstanding securities by securities dealers
and the investing public.! The proposal of the Special Study is to "integrate" and
unify disclosures to be made to investors irrespective of the immediate origin of the
securities offered to them.7 An understanding and a critique of the proposal
requires a brief description of the essential regulatory features of the Securities Act
and the Securities Exchange Act.
0The Companies Act, 1948, 11 & x2 Geo. 6, c. 38, prescribes the requirements for incorporation in
England and requires a prospectus (subject to certain exemptions set forth in the act) to be published
to investors in the case of public offerings for cash by a company. The act in its Fourth Schedule tets
forth the areas of information to be included in the prospectus. Although the act requires the prospectus
to be filed with the Board of Trade, that body does not pre-examine its contents for truth or accuracy.
However, as set forth in note 32 infra, the London Stock Exchange makes a critical and searching
examination of prospectuses pertaining to securities which it is requested to list.
The Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, requires the licensing by
the Board of Trade of all dealers in securities other than members of recognized stock exchanges or
associations of dealers in securities or dealers exempted on application by the Board of Trade. The
act contains provisions enabling the Board of Trade to prescribe standards of conduct for dealers and
requires them to keep records. The Board is also empowered to discipline dealers. Section 13 of this
act prohibits the use of written material offering securities for sale (except the Companies Act prospectus)
unless such circular is issued by a licensed dealer or a member of a recognized stock exchange or dealers'
association. The act also forbids circulars to contain any statements, promises or forecasts which the
circulator knows to be misleading, false or deceptive, and also forbids any dishonest concealment of
material facts or the reckless making of any statement, promise or forecast which is misleading, false
or deceptive.
On the subject of a proposed consolidation of the Companies Act and the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, the Jenkins Report contains the following:
"231. It has been suggested to us that the existing provisions relating to issuing and dealing in
securities in the Companies Act, 1948, and the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, x958, might with
advantage be consolidated in one act. This might be done by combining with the provisions of the
present Companies Act relating to prospectuses and offers for sale the provisions now contained in the
Prevention of Fraud Act with respect to the distribution and contents of circulars ....
"234. We recommend that: -

". . . (b) if practicable, the law should be consolidated by transferring to the Companies Act the
provisions relating to the distribution and contents of circulars, and those relating to Unit Trusts, contained in the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act .... "
It is not clear whether the Jenkins Report recommends a mere consolidation of the laws or would
amend the laws to require standards of disclosure in circulars used in cases where a prospectus is not
required under the Companies Act. The Jenkins Committee left this entire matter in the hands of a
committee (already in existence) of persons concerned with securities legislation.
Professor Louis Loss of the Harvard Law School has advocated the integration and combination of
all of the federal securities laws. In testimony before a congressional committee, he said:
"I think, if I may say so, that in a few years, when the section xi program under the Holding
Company Act, the integration and simplification program, has been quite completed, it might be a good
time to have a general look at all these statutes, with a view to integrating them into a simple code
that would make life simpler for everybody.
"And my second point is that, when that day comes, any such general re-examination should not
be a one-way street. It should seek to eliminate both unnecessary overlapping and unnecessary and
illogical gaps." Hearings Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R, 7550
and S. 2846, 83 d Cong., 2d Sess. 107 (954).
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THE MECHANICS OF "INTEGRATION"

The Securities Act regulates the public distribution of corporate securities offered
either by a business organization itself or by its controlling persons. The regulation
encompasses the filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) anterior
to any such offering of a "registration statement," which contains material information concerning the company and its affairs prescribed by the Securities Act itself
and the rules and regulations and forms of registration devised by the Commission
pursuant to the authority of the act.8 The Securities Act also requires that at some
stage in the process of offering and selling the security, the purchaser receive a
prospectus setting forth the material in the registration statement prescribed by the
Commission.' The latest point at which the purchaser can receive the prospectus is
with the delivery of the security to him after sale. However, since -any written
confirmation of the sale of the security is a prospectus as defined in the act' 0 and
since such confirmation cannot be mailed unless accompanied or preceded by the
prospectus required by the statute," in practice the purchaser receives the prospectus
with the confirmation of his purchase.
Between the date of the filing of the registration statement and the effective
date of the statement under the Securities Act, a "waiting period" of twenty days
is required unless the Commission shall shorten such period on application by the
company.'" During the waiting period written offers of the securities covered by
the registration statement may be made only by a "preliminary prospectus" or a
"summary prospectus."'"
The preliminary prospectus contains substantially all
the information required in the prospectus filed with the registration statement,
other than the offering price, underwriting commission, and incidents of the
security offered which are dependent upon the offering price, such as the basis of
conversion in the case of a convertible security. These omissions are permitted
because price and underwriting spread are usually determined by the company and
the underwriters immediately prior to the effective date of the registration statement.
The Commission, in order to promote the dissemination of material information
during the waiting period, conditions its granting of requests to shorten the statutory
waiting period (a procedure known as "acceleration") upon an adequate distribution of preliminary prospectuses to dealers who are to become members of the dealer
selling group.' 4
8Securities Act § 5, 7.
OSecurities Act § 5, 1o.
'0 Securities Act § 2(to).

'1 Securities Act § 5(b)(i).
, Securities Act § 8(a).
13Securities Act § 5(b) (i), Rules 433 and 434A of the General Rules and Regulations under the
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433, .434 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
"' Rule 46o of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.460
(Cum. Supp. 1963).
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Authority to permit the use of a summary prospectus was provided for in the
1954 amendments to the Securities Act. 5 The purpose of the summary prospectus
is to permit circulation to investors of an inexpensive summary of material categories
of information selected by the Commission and deemed sufficient to enable investors
to determine whether they wish to obtain the preliminary or effective prospectus.
The summary prospectus is not subject to the civil liabilities of section ii of the
Securities Act, although it is subject to the liabilities created by sections 2(2) and
17(a) of that act. Summary prospectuses may be used only by companies which are
required to file periodic reports with the Commission pursuant to either section
13 or section i 5 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act or by companies which
have net assets of $5,oooooo or more, have filed profit and loss or income statements
with the registration statement and have been engaged in substantially the same
business for the three preceding years, have had a net income of at least a half
million dollars and, except in certain cases, have distributed to shareholders and made
generally available an annual report in each of such three years.' 0 Summary prospectuses need contain only a summary of the facts stated in the registration statement concerning the following categories of information: the offering price and
underwriting discounts, the names of the managing underwriters and the general
nature of the underwriting commitment, the proposed method of distribution of the
securities, the intended use of the proceeds of the offering, a statement of the nature
of offerings being made other than for cash, the company's capitalization, a summary
of its earnings in the detail required in the full prospectus for the preceding five
years, the date and form of organization of the company, state of its organization
if such organization occurred within the preceding five years, a brief statement of the
general character of the business done by the company and intended to be done, a
statement of proposed and past transactions with the promoters of the company, if
any, a statement of any impending material litigation against the company, a
description of the securities being registered, and a statement as to any outstanding
options to purchase securities of the class being registered. A balance sheet and
a surplus analysis is not required and the use of condensations of such financial
statements is expressly forbidden."1
Historically, despite its short form character, the summary prospectus has not
been greatly used. Possible reasons are: (i) the summary prospectus must be
followed by the actual prospectus; (2) the possibility of civil liability under section
12(2) of the Securities Act inherent in attempts at condensation; and (3) the belief
"Securities Act § zo(b). Summary prospectuses must be in the form and content prescribed by the
rules of the Commission and must be included in the registration statement. They cannot be used for
five days after filing, a period of time during which the Commission staff examines and checks the
summary prospectuses against the registration statement and other information which it possesses concerning the company.
" Rule 4 34 A of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R.
§ 23o.434A (Cum. Supp. x963).
"'Form S-i, Instructions as to Summary Prospectuses. Form S-i is the Commission's basic form
of registration under the Securities Act.
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of many elements in the industry that such prospectuses do not sufficiently apprise
investors of the facts concerning the security to enable them to make a meaningful
analysis of the merits of the security. The probability is that the disuse of the
summary prospectus may be traced to all of these reasons in combination.
In addition to the registration and prospectus requirements, the Securities Act
also outlaws fraud in the sale of registered or unregistered sale of securities, whether
the sale is made by the issuer of the securities, its controlling persons, or others."5
A civil action is also provided against those who sell securities, whether registered
or unregistered, by misleading statements or omissions of material facts required to
make statements made not misleading under the circumstances. 9
The Securities Exchange Act regulates the trading in, and distribution of,
securities by brokers and dealers. The act regulates listing and trading of securities
20
on national securities exchanges by (i) requiring such exchanges to be registered,
and (2) requiring companies whose securities are listed or are to be listed upon such
exchange to file a registration statement containing prescribed information concerning the company and its business and to keep such information current by
annual and interim reports.2 The act also requires the registration of brokers and
dealers2 2 and authorizes the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations to
eliminate manipulative, deceptive and fraudulent practices by broker-dealers in
over-the-counter securities.23
However, except for companies which have registered securities under the
Securities Act in certain prescribed amounts,2 4 the Securities Exchange Act does not
require filing of information with the Commission concerning companies the securities of which are traded only over-the-counter. Since state laws do not ordinarily
require the dissemination of information concerning their domiciled corporations
to the public, a substantial gap has existed since the inception of the Securities
Exchange Act between public information available concerning listed securities and
companies registered under the Securities Act and securities of other publicly-held
companies which are traded over-the-counter. This anomalous regulatory gap has
confronted the Commission for years and it has persistently sought legislation to close
it. To accomplish this purpose the Commission has recently introduced legislation
which has passed the Senate and is now pending in the House of Representatives. 2 5
"'Securities Act §§ 17(a)(x), 17(a)(3).
10 Securities Act §§ 12(2), 17(a) (2).

2' Securities Exchange Act § 6.
" Securities Exchange Act § 12.
"Securities Exchange Act § X5(a).
2' Securities Exchange Act §§ io(b); i5(c).
"Securities Exchange Act § is(d).
"'S. 1642 passed on July 3o, 1963. 109 CONG. REC. 12962 (i963). H.R. 6973, 88th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1964), the House version of S. 1642, was reported to the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce by its subcommittee on March 26, 1964.
Chapter IX of the Special Study deals extensively with the so-called regulatory gap in reporting and
marshals the empirical evidence for legislation requiring the filing of reports by publicly held companies
the securities of which are traded only over the counter. The securities of virtually all stock insurance
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On the assumption that this legislation passes and information concerning such other

publicly-held over-the-counter companies is equated to that available for listed companies and those companies which meet the requirements of section i 5 (d) of the
Securities Exchange Act, the Special Study suggests that attention be directed toward
a unified disclosure and dissemination of filed information irrespective of the type
or character of the distribution of securities or their registered status under the
Securities Act.
The Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act are mutually exclusive.
Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 does not constitute registration under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Nor does listing on a national securities exchange constitute registration under the Securities Act of 1933. The latter act
applies to listed or unlisted securities alike and comes into operation whenever a
company or its controlling persons proposes to offer securities of the company to
the public.
Before setting forth the specific proposals of the Special Study, it should be pointed
out that the Commission has already achieved a degree of integration with respect
to the filing requirements contained in each act. A registration statement under
the Securities Act can become the basic registration statement under the Securities
Exchange Act.26 Similarly, financial statements and other information required
by the Securities Act which are already on file pursuant to the registration requirements of the Securities Exchange Act or other acts administered by the Commission

may be incorporated by reference in a registration statement under the Securities
Act 7 The enforcement of the fraud provisions of both acts and the discipline of
broker-dealers have been administratively integrated by the Commission in one of its
divisions, the Division of Trading and Markets.
It is, however, the movement of the information filed by reporting issuers with
the Commission to the public and the internal correlation necessary for its accomplishment which the Special Study seeks to unify. Its recommendations are as follows:
On the assumption of and in harmony with the carrying out of recommendations in
chapter IX for extending and strengthening Exchange Act reporting requirements and
wider dissemination and use of filed reports, the Commission, in consultation with incompanies and banks are traded only over the counter. S. 1642 would extend the reporting and proxy
solicitation requirements of the Securities Exchange Act initially to companies having Sx,ooo,ooo in
assets and 750 or more stockholders of record. After two years the stockholder test would be reduced
to 5oo. It is estimated that under the 750 shareholder standards approximately 3,100 companies would
be covered, of which 400 would be banks subject to appropriate federal banking regulatory agencies.
About 1,500 of the remaining 2,700 companies are already required to file reports with the Commission
under § 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, because they have previously filed registration statements
involving offers of securities at an aggregate offering price in excess of $2,000,000. Under the 500 stockholder standard the estimated figures are 3,900 companies covered, of which 6oo are banks and x,70o are
companies already required to file reports.
2'Rule Ib-3 5 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17
C.F.R. § 240.I2b-35 (Cum. Supp. 1963).
2Rule 411 of the General Rules and Regulations under Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.411
(Cum. Supp. x963).
However, financial statements required to be included in the prospectus cannot
be incorporated in such prospectus by reference.
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dustry representatives, should seek to develop a program for closer integration of disclosure requirements of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, a possible outline of
which is as follows:
I. A registered public offering of securities of any issuer (with the exceptions as may
be provided under rules of the Commission) already subject to the continuous reporting
requirements of sections 13, 14 and 16 of the Exchange Act, by reason of having a class
of stock registered on a national securities exchange or a class of "OTC listed" stock (see
ch. IX), should be permitted under a special "short-form" registration statement and
prospectus. Such short-run registration statement or prospectus should be required to
contain data concerning price and spread, and underwriting arrangements; if a primary
offering, the proposed use of proceeds, or if a secondary, the reasons for selling; capitalization; summary of earnings; recent developments in business and other material occurrences
not previously reported; financial statements, and a specific reference to previously filed
material fulfilling other requirements of the appropriate registration form, with a representation and consent that such material shall be deemed part of the present registration
statement and prospectus for all purposes of sections ii and 12 of the Securities Act.
2z. To the extent, if any, that present reporting requirements (forms 8-K, 9 -K and
io-K) or proxy soliciting requirements may be inadequate to assure an adequate reservoir
of reliable information on a current basis, these inadequacies should be appropriately
corrected entirely apart from the present recommendations. Also, to the extent practicable,
examining procedures now followed in connection with prospectuses and proxy statements should be made applicable to annual and other reports.
3. The waiting period between filing and effective date should be kept to a minimum
for short-form filings. The 4o-day period during which all dealers are required to deliver
prospectuses should be eliminated in the case of short-form filings, without limiting the
obligation of any dealer in respect of securities constituting some or all of an unsold
allotment to or subscription by such dealer as a participant in the distribution. 28

5. The importance of disclosure for the protection of investors has long been recognized in securities regulation, and it is of particular value in connection with selling
practices. The present mandatory, officially filed disclosures by issuers (reports and
proxy statements), extended and improved as recommended in chapter IX, should have
wider and more prominent use in selling activities, and the obligations of broker-dealers
in this regard should be appropriately defined by the self-regulatory agencies and the
Commission. These obligations might include such matters as: actually consulting
available officially filed data prior to recommending or selling specific securities; furnishing
copies to customers in appropriate cases; and advising customers whether officially filed
information is available with respect to any security recommended for purchase.
8. If disclosure of information is fundamental in federal securities regulation, the
widest possible dissemination and use of filed information will obviously best serve the
purposes of disclosure. In light of modern techniques for duplicating and communicating
the printed word, it would seem that dissemination and not mere filing should be
required in many instances. For example, just as there are now unofficial services that
regularly distribute summaries of data concerning individual securities, it would seem
feasible to require officially filed information to be presented in form for inexpensive
duplication and distribution. It would also seem possible to require that copies be filed
in appropriate Commission or NASD offices and/or that broker-dealers making markets
'S
'

Specidal Study, pt. i, at 594-95.
Spedal Study, pt. i, at 329.
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or recommending purchases have copies on file or actually distribute them to customers
in stated circumstances. The technical and economic feasibility of such measures and
the advances in investor protection that they would make possible should receive immediate and continuing study by the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies.80
An assessment of the merits and feasibility of these proposals from the viewpoint
of their aid to investors-the only real criterion for evaluation-will require an
analysis of their impact upon established practices and administrative procedures and
existing standards of disclosure in the public distribution of securities. The exploration of the effect of "integration" upon these matters is essentially the subject
of this article.
The Special Study is relatively precise in its recommendations as to the issuers
which may utilize a short form registration statement or prospectus and the content
of such registration statement or prospectus. It is less clear-in fact, quite vagueas to the circumstances and conditions under which securities dealers and others
shall be obligated actually to place in the hands of investors information concerning
a non-registered issue which is the subject of a distribution or a recommendation to
purchase made to investors. Nor does the Special Study make clear precisely what
information is to be furnished to investors in cases of non-registered issues.
The Special Study's recommendation for permitting the use of a short-form
prospectus and registration statement by companies which are subject to the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act presumably will have the approval of
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) which has for some time been intrigued
with the possibility of the increased listing upon its board which might occur if listed
companies were not subject to the full force of the registration requirement of the
Securities Act. During the last ten years the Exchange has consistently sought and
advocated a complete exemption from the Securities Act registration and prospectus
requirements for offerings made by companies listed on national securities exchanges
for three years or more. Support for the Exchange proposal can perhaps be derived
from that provision of the British Compahies Act which exempts from the prospectus requirements offerings by a company with securities "uniform in all re-

spects" with its securities already listed on English stock exchanges. 8' However, the
Companies Act exemption is justified by the requirement of the London Stock Exchange (upon which the great majority of publicly owned British companies are listed
and upon which the great majority of such companies seek listing) that, as a condition to the listing of new issues of already listed companies, the company prepare
a prospectus in some respects more extensive than that required by the Companies
Act or that proposed by the Special Studyf 2 Moreover, the London Stock Exchange
30

Special Study, Pt. 3, at 64.

s' Companies Act, 1948, II & x2 Geo. 6, C. 38, § 38(5).

* See JENKiNS RE'oRT 221. See also Appendix 34, Schedule HI,Part B (Requirements for Quotation), Rule 159(2) of the Rules and Regulations of the London Stock Exchange (1962). The Exchange
rules require, among other things, the name of the company, a statement by the directors "collectively
and individually" if the prospectus is to be circulated among statistical services that they "accept full
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in many respects performs the functions of examination, scrutiny and correction of
the required information contained in the prospectus which in our country are
performed by a public body, that is, the Commission.33

Notwithstanding the fact that the quest for a short-form prospectus and registration statement is attractive, attempts in the past by the Commission to provide for
condensed information and condensed financial statements have not been enthusiastically greeted by the securities industry other than the NYSE. The summary
responsibility for the accuracy of the information given and confirm having made all reasonable inquiries that to the best of their knowledge and belief, there are no other facts the omission of which
would make any statement in the prospectus misleading"; a description of the security offered and for
which quotation is sought; a statement as to the financial and trading prospects of the company, together
with any material information relevant thereto; a statement by the directors that in their opinion, working capital is sufficient or, if not, how additional working capital will be provided; financial statements
of any subsidiaries acquired since the company's last audited report; a statement since the date of the
last audited report as to all securities which have been issued or are proposed to be issued, other than
for cash, and the consideration received or to be received for such shares; information as to options on
the company's securities; full particulars of the interest of directors or any of them in any property
acquired by the company or its subsidiaries since the date of the last audited report; and a description
of all material contracts not made in the ordinary course of business. In addition, the prospectus must
designate a place within the City of London where for not less than 14 days the audited accounts
of the company for each of the two financial years immediately preceding the publication of the
prospectus, together with all notes, certificates or information required by the Companies Act, will be
available for inspection by investors.
Although the rules of the London Stock Exchange defining the content of prospectuses used in
connection with the issue of securities of a class already listed do not require a description of the
business of the issuing company, the requirement for a statement of the "financial and trading prospects
of the company" appear in many cases to make a description of the risks inherent in the company's
business necessary. As is pointed out on p. 773, at note 67 infra, companies filing registration statements on
Form S-9 have included detailed descriptions of their business even though there is no specific requirement in the form for such a description.
" In England, as a practical matter, securities offered to the public must be listed on the London
Stock Exchange if they are to have any public acceptance. As a condition of listing, the prospectus
must be presented to the Exchange for its criticism and comments in advance of public sale of the
securities. The Share and Loan Department of the Exchange makes a careful and intensive examination
of the accuracy of the statements in the prospectus and of the background and character of the managerial personnel of the company. See Althaus, Viewpoint of the Stock Exchange, in Ta ComPANY
Pos'aEaTus 7 (Gee & Co., 1953)- See also JENKINs REPORT 252(q) which contains a recommendation
that the Board of Trade scrutinize for misleading statements prospectuses relating to securities for which
listing on the London Stock Exchange is not contemplated. Presently the Board of Trade does not
investigate the accuracy of prospectuses filed with it pursuant to the requirements of the Companies
Act. See also GOWER, op. dt. supra note x, at 273-89.
The financial bar will find a nostalgic interest in the requirement of the London Stock Exchange
as to the filings of amendments to the prospectus. The Exchange's rules provide that where any
material amendment is made, copies shall be submitted to the Share and Loan Department for approval
and such copies "shall be marked in red to indicate amendments to comply with points raised by the
Department and in blue or black to indicate other amendments." The point of view of an English
solicitor in respect of the Stock Exchange's scrutiny of prospectuses also has an interesting analogy for
the American bar. In Brown, The Lawyer's Approach, in THE ComPANY PRosPE-rus 16, 27 (1953), the
following appears: "Also . . . the necessity to submit the draft [of the prospectus] to the Share and
Loan Department of the Stock Exchange for comment can be most useful. I know that on occasions
the comments made by the officials of that department appear, to those familiar with the details of the
matter, to be futile and irritating. They do, however, and by no means infrequently, notice-points
which others have overlooked, and I personally would regret any change in the procedure in this
respect. But I suppose that, following the advice I give to my clients on prospectuses, I ought to 'come
clean' and disclose to you that I am interested, since..I have .the privilege of acting, as one of the legal
advisers to the Stock Exchange.'-
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prospectus is illustrative of this fact. Investment bankers have feared that condensation might enhance the possibility of liability under the civil liabilities sections of the
Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act.3 4 In addition, the mere existence of
information in the files of the Commission does not in itself justify a cutting down of
information required to reach the investor. The essence of the purpose of the Securities Act is to place in the hands of an investor, in the crystallized form of a prospectus,
all of the essential information required for an intelligent analysis of value so that he
need not be required to go elsewhere to form a judgment as to the merits of the
security. What is basically necessary is a determination of the information which is
essential to judgment formation and a system for placing such information in a compact package in the hands of an investor prior to the time he makes a decision to
purchase or sell a security.
Later sections of this article will discuss what information is essential to the making
of this decision. There are, however, certain important considerations in the
mechanics of preparing and filing information and registration statements with the
Commission and the processing of such filings by the Commission staff which have
an important bearing on the feasibility of "integration" and which need discussion
here.
The Securities Act provides for a registration statement and prospectus which
is basically current as of the effective date of the offering. In the preparation of a
registration statement and prospectus there is applied the knowledge of counsel,
independent public accountants for the issuer and, usually, counsel for the underwriter and the underwriters themselves. Finally, there is a careful examination of
the end product of these individuals by the staff of the Commission. The result,
generally speaking, is a carefully worked out compendium of information which
has been preceded by a carefully prepared inquiry into the business of the company,
its divisions, and their relative contributions to sales, their relative risks and competition. In addition, known trends in the backlogs of business and receipts of new
orders by the issuer are carefully explored.
In contrast, filings under the Securities Exchange Act represent the product
of the company and its counsel and its independent accountants only. The advice
and critical scrutiny of an investment banking house which itself may incur civil
liabilities for errors and omissions is absent. And, although the original form of
registration (Form io) is carefully scrutinized by the Commission's staff, the annual
and interim reports required by the act normally receive only secondary attention
by the staff which as a matter of practice gives precedence to Securities Act registration statements in its examination procedure. The review of annual and interim
reports is particularly superficial during a time when, as in the roughly two-year
period ending May 31, i962 the volume of registration statements filed under the
" See the testimony of Professor Loss in HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce on H.R. 755o and S. 2846, 8 3 d Cong., 2d Sess. zo5-o6 (1954).
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Securities Act was extraordinarily heavy. Moreover, the information required by
the annual report (Form io-K) and the interim reports (Forms 8-K and 9 -K) is not
current. The annual report need not be filed with the Commission until 12o days
after the close of the fiscal period for which the information is filed. The interim
reports are required to be filed on the occurrence of certain events and then only
within ten days of the close of the month in which the event occurs. The semiannual report of earnings (Form 9 -K) is not required to be filed before forty-five
days after the close of the semiannual accounting period.
Unlike Securities Act prospectuses, which are relatively compact, the filings under
the Securities Exchange Act are characterized by their bulk and lack of periodic
synthesis. Annual reports are followed by interim reports, which are followed
by annual reports. Interim reports disclose acquisitions and dispositions of properties, issuances and reductions in outstanding capital, and other matters. Although
the annual report requires a discussion of changes in the business of a company
during the preceding annual fiscal period, this requirement is frequently honored
more in the breach than in the observance. In short, to obtain the current situation
of a company, a very careful analysis, synthesis, and correlation of the filed information may often be required since it is often difficult to determine whether information once filed is any longer relevant.
In addition, information which investors find important to the making of
intelligent judgments about a security is not required to be filed under the provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act. The Securities Exchange Act does not require disclosure of material contracts of the issuer-whether or not made in the ordinary
course of its business. Legislation proposed by the Commission, however, and now
pending before Congress, would correct this deficiency. 5 The Commission also
has not exercised its authority under the Securities Exchange Act to require earnings
reports in addition to those contained in the annual and semiannual reports. In
this respect, the Commission lags behind the NYSE and other exchanges which
require for the great bulk of their listed companies the publication of quarterly
statements of earnings. 3 Material information such as known trends in backlogs
of orders and the current rate of receipt of new orders are not required to be
furnished. Transactions between the company and its subsidiaries with insiders
are required to be reported only in the annual report or in a proxy statement which
37
presently is required only if a solicitation of proxies occurs
The Special Study is quite right in its recommendation that irrespective of the
' Sec note 25 supra.
's See N.Y. SToCK EXCHANGE

COMPANY MANUAL

A-69.

"The Commission's proposed legislation to bring certain publicly-held over-the-counter companies
within the reporting and proxy solicitation requirements of the Securities Exchange Act would require
the furnishing annually to shareholders of information equivalent to that contained in a proxy statement
used in connection with the annual meeting, even if a solicitation of proxies is not in fact made. See
S. Rrip. No. 379, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 24 (1963). The NYSE for the past several years has imposed
the same requirement upon its listed companies.
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problem of integration, the Commission should consider the development of requirements for more current information and for more current processing by the staff
of such information 3 Steps in this direction might include requirements that
annually a five-year summary of earnings be presented. A further step might also
be. a rule that annually, not a description of changes in the business during the year,
but a restatement of its business, be made in the form required by the standards of the
Securities Act. Such restatements would seem essential if broker-dealers and investment bankers making distributions not required to be registered under the Securities
Act are to be compelled to disseminate information concerning earnings and the
current business of the company. The financial bar is well aware of the sometimes
radical' changes which are required in previously reported earnings as a result
of the effect of later events upon such earnings.
The Special Study conceives of its proposals for short-form registration statements
and prospectuses for companies reporting under the Securities Exchange Act as
a time-saving device. The Special Study's concept of short-form registration, however, does not really contemplate a short-form statement in fact. What it contemplates is a registration statement divided between information filed for the purposes of the Securities Act and information previously filed under the Securities
Exchange Act and incorporated by reference into such registration statement.
Mechanically, therefore, it is difficult to see in what respect processing time by the
staff of the Division of Corporation Finance of the so-called short-form registration statement can be shortened. In practice, the staff will examine the two filings
simultaneously. Moreover, the financial bar itself may find that the preparation of
registration statements and prospectuses in their traditional form is preferable to the
filing of the extensive amendments which may be necessary to keep current the
reports filed under the Securities Exchange Act. A proper respect for possible
liabilities under the civil liabilities sections of the various acts also may dictate such
a course. The Special Study is most unclear as to the persons in the chain of
distribution upon whom will fall the burden to make the disclosures of material
information which do not appear in the short-form prospectus. Thus, it may be
illusory to postulate a shorter waiting period for short form registration statements
as a necessary consequence of integration.
"Anotherreason for incorporating all material and information into the prospectus
"Form 8-K, the present form for filing interim information under the Securities Exchange Act,
requires the information to be filed within ten days after the close of the month in which the event
required to be reported occurs. Moreover, the events which must be reported are limited to those
specified in the first eleven items of the form. The company may, at its option, report any other
information which it considers material. Consideration should be given to a requirement that a Form
8-K. report be made promptly after the release by the reporting company directly or by its representatives,
such as public relations counsel, indirectly, of information concerning the business of the company
othcEdthan routine changes in its management. Thus, press releases would become subject to the civil
and criminal liabilities of the Securities Exchange Act. The Special Study's proposed legislation to make
intehtional or reckle's dissemination of misleading statements in press releases a criminal offense would
thus become unnecessary. See Special Study, pt. 3, at 99-102.
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results from the imposition of liability by section 12 of the Securities Act upon any
person who offers or sells a security by means of a prospectus containing any material
misstatements or omissions. It is far from clear that the requirements of that section
are met by a prospectus which merely incorporates material facts by referring to
documents or reports filed with the Commission a For example, the Special Study's
proposed short-form prospectus need not contain any material describing the
remuneration of the company's officers and directors or their transactions with the
company. However, in many cases such information may be material. As a
consequence, attorneys for issuers, underwriters, and dealers may not feel that their
clients are sufficiently protected unless such information is included in the prospectus
or otherwise physically placed before the investor.
As has been indicated, the Special Study Report suggests the need for the dissemination of information to investors requested to purchase securities in the case
of distributions not subject to the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
In a subsequent section of this article, an attempt will be made to describe the
situations in which such disclosure is desirable and important. At this juncture,
however, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that in the case of unregistered
offerings, the already described problems which exist in the case of registered
offerings are much more acute. These problems form the background for industry
opposition to the idea that material information must be physically given to
investors offered securities in public distributions not subject to the registration
requirements of the Securities Act. The industry argues that the information
required in annual and interim reports under the Securities Exchange Act are "of
interest to expert technicians and analysts and certainly not to the ordinary in' a It argues further that obtaining
vestor. SE
and conveying the information to investors will be costly and burdensome and beyond the economic capacities of the
ordinary broker-dealer. It also asserts that the industry should be its own best judge
as to what information is needed for investors and the sources from which it may be
obtained. 40
Although the industry's criticism reflects a fear that the Special Study intends
to impose duties on broker-dealers to collect and disseminate information in a far
larger number of cases than a fair reading of the Special Study would indicate, a
valid concern does exist in those cases where the duty would be imposed. This
concern would be intensified if the Special Study's suggestions for a substantial
overhauling and improvement in reporting requirements under the Securities
" There would be no problem under § ii of the Securities A ct, since liability under that section
is based solely on information stated or omitted from the registration statement. Information has
traditionally been permitted to be included in a registration statement by incorporating it by reference.
...MEmORANDU
ON SELLING PtAcricS oF THE AMUCAN SECUTIEs INDUsmy-A PROPOSAL Or
POLICY AND AN .ANALYSIS OF RELATED RECOiMENDATIONS IN THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
STUnY ay -AN AD Hoc ComrrrEE OF THE INVESTMENT BANKERS AsSoCrATION OF AMERICA 14 (Dec. 2,
1963).
'o
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Exchange Act along the lines which have been previously suggested is not accomplished.
Reproduction of the actual filed reports in the order in which they have occurred,
for example, for the five preceding fiscal years, would indeed be cumbersome and
difficult of analysis by an ordinary investor. Concise summaries of earnings and
descriptions of a company's business are essential if the information is to be made
compact and serviceable in the case of offerings not subject to the requirements of
the Securities Act. For the security dealer or investment banker to undertake the
job of simplification, condensation and summary involves a risk of liability of real
concern. As has been stated, section 12 of the Securities Act creates a civil liability
on those who sell a security by a misleading prospectus or other communication,
written or oral, and places the burden upon the seller to establish that he had not
known, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the misleading character of the communication. Moreover, the civil liability created by
section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section io(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act as implemented by Rule iob-5 41 may not permit a defense of lack of knowledge
or reasonable care. 2 The civil liability risks of an attempt by a security dealer
himself to condense or summarize filed material information concerning earnings and
other aspects of the reports of an issuer would seem to be sustantial in the absence
of a dear rule promulgated by the Commission granting absolution from civil
liability for a summarization or condensation fairly made in good faith by the
disseminator of the filed information. Existence of such a rule and the brokerdealer's reliance upon it would absolve him from civil liability pursuant to section
i9(a) of the Securities Act and section 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act.

In the absence of a clear rule of absolution, the broker-dealer held liable for the
dissemination of information contained in filed reports which is in fact misleading
may have no effective remedy against the company or its controlling persons who
were responsible for the filing of such information with the Commission. Section
17(a) of the Securities Act and section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and its
implementing Rule iob-5 apply only when misleading statements are made in the
"offer or sale" of a security. In many of the transactions in which broker-dealers
might have to disseminate information to their customers, it would be impossible
to hold that the issuer or its controlling persons in any way engaged in the offer or
sale of a security. Moreover, it is not at all clear that even if the issuer or its controlling persons were offering or selling a security that the broker-dealer (who has
not purchased any security) would have a right under either of these sections against
" Sec. 17(a) of the Securities Act, generally speaking, makes it unlawful for any person to sell a
security by misleading statements or omissions or by deceptive, fraudulent or manipulative devices or
practices. Sec. io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule iob-5 make it unlawful in connection
with a purchase or sale of a security to engage in such practices. For a discussion of the civil liabilities
created by these sections and Rule iob-5, see 3 Louis Loss, SECURiTIES REGULATION 1763-97 (2d ed.
1961).
'23 Loss, op. cit. supra note 41, at 1765, 1779.
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the issuer or its controlling persons. The direct remedy available to those persons
injured by false statements made in any reports or documents filed under the
Securities Exchange Act is contained in section i8 of the act. However, recovery

requires proof by the injured person that he relied upon the false statements (which
presumably would not be too difficult) and, more important, that such false statements affected the price at which the security was purchased or sold (often an impossible task of proof). Even if this heavy burden of proof is met, recovery may still
be defeated if the person sued can prove he acted in good faith and had no knowledge
that the statement relied on was false 3
II
WHO SHALL

BE

REQUIRED TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION

The Securities Act, as has been stated, requires a written prospectus to reach the
investor and places this obligation on the issuer, underwriters, and dealers who are
in the chain of distribution, as long as they have unsold allotments of the security.
This obligation, in effect, is placed upon all other dealers selling such securities for
a period of forty days after the effective date of the registration statement."4 On the
other hand, the Securities Exchange Act contains no express obligation upon the
part of anyone to bring the information concerning the corporation and its "insiders" which must be filed with the Commission to the attention of investors or
even of stockholders 5
The rationale for the differences in the requirements of the two acts derives
essentially from the nature of "distribution" as against "trading" in securities. The
Securities Act offering involves a "distribution," i.e., the sale of a large block of
securities emanating from the issuer or its controlling persons and effectuated usually

through the organized channels and mechanics of a securities offering-a con"' For a discussion of the infirmities of the civil remedy afforded by § 18 of the Securities Exchange
Act, ee 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 41, at 1751-54.
" Securities Act § 4(I). The Commission's proposed legislation discussed in note 25 supra, would,
if enacted, empower it to shorten the forty-day period or to increase the period to a maximum of ninety
days in the case of more speculative issues.
The Special Study's short-form integration regulation
includes a suggestion in cases approved for short-form prospectuses that the forty-day dealer use period
be eliminated. Implicit in this suggestion is that the short-form prospectus would be made available
only in the case of seasoned companies. However, many companies listed on national securities exchanges
and many over-the-counter companies which would become reporting companies if the Commission's
proposed legislation is passed are far from high grade on any basis of security analysis. By and large,
if mere reporting is to be the criterion for short-form prospectus treatment, the forty-day period should
be maintained.
"The national securities exchanges require listed companies to transmit an annual report including
certified financial statements to shareholders. See N.Y. STOCK ExCHANGNCOMPANY MANUAL § 4 A. For
example, the NYSE requires the annual report to be submitted to shareholders at least fifteen days prior to
the stockholders' annual meeting, but not less than three months after the close of the company's fiscal
year. The Commission has recently adopted an amendment to its proxy rules requiring proxy statements
to be accompanied or preceded by an annual report containing financial statements certified by independent
public accountants in form and content as filed in the company's annual report to the Commission on
Porm io-K. Rule 14a-3 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (Cune. Supp. 1963).
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tractual linking together of underwriters and dealers who in some cases assume
substantial pecuniary risks and in all cases are compensated at rates higher than
those usually obtainable in transactions involving purchases and sales of securities
among investors and broker-dealers. In these "distributions," therefore, incentives
for the rapid and aggressive selling of the securities exist.48 There is, therefore, need
of some type of apparatus to overcome the blandishments of salesmen and others
motivated by the prospect of higher than usual gain or reward. The physical dissemination of material information in crystallized, coherent form is essential to
enable investors in such circumstances not only to form a judgment as to the
objective merits of the security, but also to appraise and evaluate the optimistic
predictions, promises and forecasts which may be made to them by salesmen.
In short, the essential fact situation with which the Securities Act deals is the
presence of an inventory of securities to be offered rapidly to the public with the
prospect of comparatively high rewards to underwriters and dealers.
This same fact situation, however, does not exist in the case of trading in outstanding securities among investors and dealers. The Securities Exchange Act is
premised upon the belief that brokers in listed securities who, under the rules of the
exchanges, receive like commissions for identical dollar amounts of investments in
listed securities, are unlikely to over-pressure investors to purchase a particular
security. The information under the act is thus intended to be available essentially
for the information of brokers who are capable of digesting it, analyzing it, collating
it, and forming a judgment which is transmitted to investors without undue
pecuniary bias. To be sure, investors may be solicited to purchase listed securities,
but in the absence of the pecuniary drive of the ownership by the broker of an
inventory of securities which may create peculiar incentives to dispose of the
particular security, the solicitation is presumably based, and indeed legally required
to be based, upon an honest and unbiased appraisal.
These essential differences between trading and distribution suggest a reasonable
classification of those who should or should not be compelled to disseminate information to investors in the form of a prospectus or circular in the case of
offerings not subject to registration under the Securities Act. In short, those who
"See

the Special Study, pt. i, at 481-82 for a discussion of the distinction between "distribution"

and "trading."

Distributions not requiring registration under the Securities Act may be made of listed

as well as unlisted securities. Although many unregistered distributions may be made "regular way"
on an exchange, the exchanges have developed techniques, such as the "exchange distribution" dnd the
"special offering plan," to dispose of large blocks of securities quickly using the facilities of the exchange
but outside the auction market. Both the exchange distribution and special offering plan technique are
characterized by the payment to salesmen of a higher rate of compensation than they would receive with
respect to normal trading transactions. See Special Study, pt. i, at 560-64, for a description of the
types of unregistered distributions. There is no reason why these types of unregistered distribution of
listed securities should not -be subjected to any requirement for information dissemination which the
Commission may evolve in connection with unregistered distributions. Sales of large blocks of listed
shares, however, "regular way' which do not require registration under the Securities Act, should
not be within such a rule so long as the distribution is not accompanied by the use of devices to stimulate
sales.
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offer an inventory of securities substantial in dollar amount to the total outstanding
securities of the same class, on an organized basis to the public, whether directly
themselves through their own salesmen or through an independent dealer group,
should be required to furnish information directly in the form of a prospectus or
brochure to those who are offered the security. This general rule would free from
the requirements of physical delivery of information to investors, security dealers
who are merely recommending an offering of securities to investors which they do
not own in quantity and which they have concluded are of investment merit based
on their own examination of the information afforded by the Securities Exchange
Act. Similarly, the National Association of Securities Dealers' "fair mark-up"
interpretation of its rules of fair practice imposes limitations on the pecuniary gain
to over-the-counter dealers in such transactionsY The situation is thus somewhat
analogous to the standard commissions which brokers obtain on the purchase and
sale of listed securities. On the other hand, brokers and dealers participating in a
distribution of an inventory of securities, listed or unlisted, on commission or other
remunerative bases higher than the usual commissions (or who have a large, unrealized profit upon an inventory offered over the counter on even a fair mark-up
basis) should be obligated to furnish information to investors in physical form
prior to their actual purchase of the security.
The broker-dealers who are capable of assembling for their own account, or
offering on behalf of others, large inventories of securities and distributing them
to the public are usually the firms with substantial amounts of capital who are
quite capable of preparing information for circularization to investors. Indeed, there
seems to be a recent tendency for investment bankers or security dealers offering
substantial inventories of securities, listed or unlisted, which involve commissions or
pecuniary gains substantially higher than those obtainable in ordinary trading transaction, to prepare and distribute written information to investors concerning the
issues notwithstanding the possible danger of civil liabilities to which reference has
already been made. Moreover, the unfolding development of the content of the
phrase "manipulative, deceptive and fraudulent practices" as used in the Securities
Exchange Act4 in the Commission's opinions in broker-dealer disciplinary proceedings under the Securities Exchange Act indicates a strong tendency to pronounce
"' See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SEcuRrTIEs DEAL as (NASD) MANuAL Gi-6 (1964). The Manual
states that as a general rule "it shall be deemed inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade
for a member to enter into any transaction with a customer in any security at any price not reasonably
related to the current market price of the security or to charge a commission which is not reasonable."
Although the NASD's policy acknowledges that reasonableness is a function of many factors including
the price, availability and market for the security, in general practice a mark-up of five per cent of
the current offering price in the over-the-counter market (assuming there is a valid and independent
market) in most cases is deemed reasonable. The NASD's fair mark-up policy, however, does not
apply to the sale of securities where a prospectus or offering circular is required to be delivered and the
securities are sold at the specified offering price.
"8See Securities Exchange Act §§ io(b), I5(c)(i) and (2) and the rules promulgated by the
Commission pursuant to the authority of these sections.
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the failure to deliver such information in such cases within the prohibition of this
phrase.
The Commission has increasingly taken the position that recommendations of
securities being distributed in an organized manner by dealers and salesmen must
be backed by information to substantiate the reasonableness of the security analysis
or predictions made to the public. The Commission in fact has stated in the case
of distributions of lesser known securities that it is almost a positive obligation
for dealers making distributions of inventories of such securities to supply investors
with the material facts concerning the issuer. Thus, it has stated:
A broker-dealer undertaking the sale of a block of securities . . . has the further problem
of avoiding conduct which will violate the anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities
laws. In making such a distribution, he will probably find it necessary, or at least
desirable, to recommend purchase of the security by his customers. The Commission has,
however, repeatedly held that it is a violation of the anti-fraud provisions for a brokerdealer to recommend a security unless there is an adequate and reasonable basis for the
recommendations, and, further that such recommendations should not be made without disclosure of facts known or reasonably ascertainable, bearing upon the justification jor
the recommendation. As indicated, the making of recommendations for the purchase of
a security implies that the dealer has a reasonable basis for such recommendations which,
in turn, requires that, as a pre-requisite, he shall have made a reasonable investigation.
In addition, if such a dealer lacks essential information about the issuer, such as knowledge
of its financial condition, he must disclose this lack of knowledge and caution customers
as to the risk involved in purchasing the securities without it....49
It is true that these statements by the Commission were made with respect to
distributions of so-called "obscure" securities. Nevertheless, the Commission's conclusions would seem to be of universal applicability. Certainly broker-dealers recommending any security would do well to be fortified with current information concerning the company which reasonably supports their recommendation. Even more
protection from the standpoint of avoidance of disciplinary proceedings can be
obtained by the delivery of such information to investors.50
If information is to be physically delivered to investors in connection with a
distribution not subject to the Securities Act registration requirements, reasons of
"' See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445 (Feb. 2, 1962). (Footnotes omittcd; emphasis added.)
InW
the Matter of Alexander Reid & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6727 (Feb. 8, 1962)
the Commission stated: "A broker-dealer in his dealings with customers impliedly represents that his
opinions and predictions respecting a stock which he had undertaken to recommend are responsibly made
on the basis of actual knowledge and careful consideration. Without such basis the opinion and predictions are fraudulent ... "
"oThe New York Stock Exchange in its NYSE Guide, para. 2474Aio, states: "(i) Recommendations-In recommending the purchase, sale or switch of specific securities, supporting information should be
provided or offered."
In the Matter of D. F. Bernheimer & Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7oo
(Jan. 23, 1963), the Commission stated: "We have repeatedly held that it is inconsistent with principles
of fair dealing and violative of the securities laws for a broker or dealer to induce purchases of securities
by means of representations unsupported by a reasonable factual basis and without dijclosure of known
or reasonably available informaion necessary to provide the investor with a fair picture of the security
being offered." (Emphasis added.)
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practicality and expediency would compel some finite rule by the Commission
defining the "distributions" which should be accompanied by such delivery.51
Since the obtaining and crystallization of information in an offering circular may
involve a degree of expense, requirements for physical delivery of information
should be restricted to distributions which can support such expense.
As a tentative suggestion, for example, an offering involving solicitation by
salesmen, with compensation to them for effecting sales higher than that paid in
trading transactions involving similar securities or resales of inventories, where there
is a substantial profit to be obtained on the basis of the cost of the inventory, should
be conditioned upon the physical delivery of information to investors, if the offering
involves or is one of a known series of contemplated offerings which will involve
either more than five per cent of the outstanding shares of the issuer, or a total
offering price of $30oooo or more. The $3oo,ooo figure is arbitrary, but it is a figure

in current use by the Commission to define an offering unregistered under the
Securities Act for which market stabilizing operations by the offerors in aid of the
distribution must be reported to the Commission.52 Thus the proposed rule for
physical distribution of information will have a nexus with existing and known
practice in connection with these types of offerings. Similarly, a finite definition
of the "distributions" which would be subject to a requirement for the physical
delivery of information to investors should also be synchronized with any new
definition of a "particular distribution" under Rule iob-6 of the Securities Exchange
Act, which may ultimately be evolved as a result of discussions between the Commission and the securities industry. Rule iob-6, generally speaking, prohibits issuers,
underwriters and dealers from bidding for or purchasing securities in the open
market while securities of the issuer of the same class are the subject of a "particular
distribution" to the public. The most vexing problem in connection with this rule
from the industry standpoint has been its failure to define the word "distribution."53
The Special Study recommends that the rule be amended to define "distribution"
"sSections 15(c)(i) and (2) of the Securities Exchange Act confer upon the Commission rulemaking power to define deceptive, manipulative and fraudulent devices and practices. Presumably, a
rule could be enacted pursuant to this section to codify the trend of Commission decisions illustrated
by the Bernheimer case, supra note 5o, and the cases cited by the Commission in that case. See also

Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 Moc. L. REv. 680, 730-50 (1964).
"aSee Rule 17a-2(a) of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
17 C.F.R. § 240.57a-2(a) (Cum. Supp. 1963). The $300,000 figure also corresponds to the maximum
public offering which the Commission may exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act
of 1933. Securities Act § 3(b). See also Rule 254 of the General Rules and Regulations under the
Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (Cum. Supp. 1963). Rule 256 of the General Rules and
Regulations under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (Cum. Supp. 1963) requires as a
condition to exemption from the usual requirement of the Securities Act the filing with the Commission
of an "offering circular" which must be given to purchasers of the securities and which contains all of the
information in the categories of disclosure set forth in the text but does not require financial statements
to be certified by independent public accountants. The use of an offering circular in offerings of less
than $3oo,ooo has proved to be economically feasible.
See Whitney, Rule rob-6, The Special Study's Rediscovered Rule, 62 MicH. L. Rav. 567 (1964);
.ee also Special Study, pt. i, at 568.
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for the purpose of the rule to relate to offerings of $3ooo0o or more.5 4 The desirability of a precise definition of "distribution" is clear; it would seem equally
desirable to enlarge this rule to include a requirement for the dissemination of information with respect to the distributions to be covered by the rule as ultimately
amended. The combination will facilitate a greater accomplishment of the purpose
of Rule iob-6 to prevent fraud.
III
SCOPE OF INFORMATION TO BE DISSEM,INATED

Consideration must now be given to the minimum areas of information which
should be disseminated to investors, both in the case of issues registered under the
Securities Act and in the case of securities of companies subject to the reporting
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act as it now exists and as proposed to be
amended by the legislation sponsored by the Commission.
Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act are essentially disclosure
statutes. They are postulated on the premise that purchasing and selling securities is
a rational process which can be aided by current material information concerning the
company and its financial and earnings prospects. However, the degree of disclosure to be furnished investors depends upon the objective sought by the disclosure. Thus disclosure can be based simply on the notion that the information
supplied should be sufficient to prevent a gross fraud and to enable an investor to
appraise properly the more extravagant blandishments of salesmen. On the other
hand, if the objective of disclosure is to enable a careful comparative analysis of
the security against securities of other companies in the same industry, or securities
of companies of other industries, a greater amount of information must be supplied.
Historically, in England, the objective of prevention of fraud has been the
paramount consideration in framing disclosure requirements. The Companies
Act of 1948 and its predecessors have not required essential material for security
analysis such as "turn-over" information, i.e., information as to gross sales and cost
of sales in income accounts. Nor are details of the issuer's business by divisions and
percentages of sales required to be disclosed.t 5 The Commission, on the other hand,
"' Special Study, pt. x, at 570.
" The Jenkins Report recommends that "turnover"

figures be included in each of the five-year's
earning statements required for prospectuses by the Fourth Schedule of the Companies Act. See JnNKINs
REPo-R
243, 393. The Jenkins Report also found that in many cases publicly-owned companies did
not comply with the Companies Act requirement that the annual report to shareholders include, among
other things, "the main activities of the company and its subsidiaries during the fiscal year" and "any
major change in these activities during the year."
Although the Companies Act does not require the prospectus to contain anything more than a
description of the general nature of the business done by the company, the London Stock Exchange does
require information as to the relative importance of the divisions of its business where a company
carries on "two or more activities which are material having regard to profits and losses, assets employed,
or other factors." Appendix 36 of the Rules of the London Stock Exchange at 203 (x96a).
The Jenkins Report recommends that the Companies Act be amended to require prospectuses to meet
the same standards as those set forth by the London Stock Exchange Rule. JENXINs REPoRT 252(e).

INTEGRATION OF THE DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

within the confines of its permissible authority under the Securities Act, has gone
further and sought to obtain information which at least would form the basis for
a reasonable securities analysis. It has not required all the information necessary
to an analysis in depth of the value of a particular company's securities. For
example, little information concerning labor relations or labor contracts is required
to be included in registration statements under the Securities Act nor is it possible
to determine relative costs of labor in the total operating expenses of the company.
Comparative profit margins of the issuer and the industry in general or other
industries is not commonly disclosed. Nevertheless, the Commission by its accounting requirements which enable gross profit margins to be determined and its requirement for disclosure of comparative conditions and the place of the company in its
own industry provides some material for comparative analysis.56
Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act define in detail the areas
of information to be obtained in registration statements for the sale of securities to
the public or for listing on national securities exchanges. The Securities Exchange
Act is more rigid than the Securities Act in that the discretion of the Commission
to obtain additional or different information is less flexible than its authority under
the Securities Act. The latter act empowers the Commission to expand the statutory
categories of required information if it finds it necessary in the public interest or for
the protection of investors. However, it may not permit the omission of any
material required by law unless it is able to find that disclosure fully adequate for
the protection of investors is otherwise included in the registration statement."
The Commission's powers, however, in respect of the prospectus as distinguished
from the registration statement are more ample. It may permit the omission from
the prospectus of information required to be included in the registration statement
if it finds that such omitted information is not necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors s
The Securities Act in its Schedule A sets forth thirty-two paragraphs containing
areas of information to be included in a registration statement. The Securities
Exchange Act, although more concise in its requirements,59 presently permits
the Commission to obtain basically the same information it could obtain in a registration statement under the Securities Act with the exception of its inability to obtain
information concerning material contracts of the company whether or not made in
Thus, if the Jenkins Report's recommendations are adopted, the Companies Act requirements will move
very substantially toward the concept of a prospectus which requires adequate information for a securities
analysis. This movement is to be contrasted with the Special Study's recommendation of a short-form
prospectus.
" For a discussion of a rationale for determining areas of information necessary for a securities
analysis, see Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. LAw. 300
(i961).
" Securities Act § 7"' Securities Act § io(a)(4).
"' Securities Exchange Act § i2(b).

770

LANW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

the regular course of its business. As already indicated, this deficiency will be corrected if the legislation now pending before the Congress is adopted.
The information required by both acts to be included in registration statements
may be broadly divided into five categories:
Category A includes information concerning the company's organization and
a description of its business and operating properties.
Category B includes financial statements, that is, a balance sheet and income
accounts for the three preceding fiscal years certified by independent public
accountants.

Category C includes a description of securities being offered as well as capitalization of the company and the effect of the rights of the securities being offered
upon the rights of the outstanding securities as well as the effect upon the securities
being offered of the rights of the outstanding securities and a description of the
proposed use of the proceeds of the offering.
Category D includes the names and addresses of the directors, officers and controlling persons of the issuer, their existing and proposed remuneration and a description of their past and contemplated transactions with the issuer and its subsidiaries.
Category E includes the names and addresses of the underwriters, a description
of the terms of the underwriting agreement and the amount of the underwriting
commissions and other things of value to be received by the underwriters.
Historically, all of these categories of information (with some exceptions which
will be discussed later) have been required to be included in registration statements
and prospectuses under the Securities Act. In its prospectus requirements the Commission generally has heeded Speaker Rayburn's oft-quoted comment that securities
are "intricate merchandise," and that this fact should be impressed upon investors
by a requirement that the prospectus contain virtually all of the revelations in the
registration statement. In Mr. Rayburn's report on behalf of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce with respect to the Securities Act, he stated:
The purpose of these sections is to secure for potential buyers the means of understanding
the intricacies of the'transaction into which they are invited. The full revelations required in the filed "registration statement" should not be lost in the actual selling process.
This requirement will undoubtedly limit the selling arguments hitherto employed. That
is its purpose. But even in respect of certain types of listed issues, reputable stock exchanges have already, on their own initiative, recognized the danger of abbreviated
selling literature and insisted upon supervising the selling of literature distributed in
connection with such issues, to make certain that such literature includes the same information concerning the issue required in a formal circular filed with and approved by
such exchanges. Any objection that the compulsory incorporation in selling literature
and sales argument of substantially all information concerning the issue will frighten
the buyer with the intricacy of the transaction, states one of the best arguments for
the provision. The rank and file of securities buyers who have hitherto bought blindly
should be made aware that securities are intricate merchandiseY60
" H.R. REP. No. 85,
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If the Commission is to depart in its prospectus requirements from the principles
set forth by Speaker Rayburn, it can only do so if it finds that the public interest
and the protection of investors make such departure desirable.6 1
The traditional argument is that prospectuses are not generally read because
they are too long and because the information they contain is too complex to be
understood by the average investor. This argument exaggerates the problem. In
the one instance in which the Special Study investigated the reactions of investors
to prospectuses, it was discovered that a substantial number of investors read
prospectuses and spend considerable time in doing so-albeit that there was some
question about the degree to which these investors understood what they were
reading.6 2 According to a recent study of individual stock ownership, seventy-five
per cent of individual shareholders are either engaged in professional or managerial
occupations. 3 This same study also indicates that individual stockholders in the
lower economic groups tend to avoid speculative issues and to concentrate their
investments in stocks of telephone and communication companies, electric and gas
utilities, and investment companies. The middle and upper income groups contain
the persons most willing to invest in speculative securities. Thus, the ability to read
and to understand prospectuses does not necessarily appear to be beyond the capabilities of the average investor. In addition, the Commission, itself, has made great
strides in reducing the length of prospectuses without eliminating any vital information contained in the categories of disclosure set forth above.
The determination of the categories of information to be included in the
prospectus depends primarily upon the degree to which the Commission deems it
important to provide facts required for security analysis as distinguished from information solely needed to offset the predictions and exaggerations of salesmen.
Neither the Securities Act nor the Securities Exchange Act states which of the two
objectives is to be achieved. However, as is indicated by the definition of "material"
in Rule 405 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities Act, 64 the
Commission has sought attainment of the first objective-at least in connection
with the distribution of securities registrable under the Securities Act.
From the viewpoint of economic theory, investment in securities is basically a
placing of capital with a view to as large a return as possible consistent with the
ol Securities Act § io(a)(4).
6. At the request of the Commission, the Securities Research Unit of the Wharton School of Finance
and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania, conducted a "Survey of Mutual Fund Investors." The Survey
developed the fact that "the average time devoted to reading the prospectus was a little over one hour
for regular purchases and a little less than an hour and a half for those who bought contractual plans."
See Special StUdy, pt. 4, at 343.
03 See Crockett & Friend, Characteristics of Stock Ownership, in AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION,
1963 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC STATISTICs SECTION 146 (1963).

at 17 C.F.R. § 240.405

(1949).

The rule states that "the . . . term 'material,'

when used to

qualify a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, limits the information
required to those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed
before purchasing the security registered."
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risks involved in the enterprise selected for investment." Given this economic
premise, intelligent analysis of possible future returns on an investment will require,
as a minimum, disclosure of information within Categories A, B and C set forth
above. Only to a lesser extent would information in Categories D and E be of
importance in determining the economics of an investment. 0 Generally speaking,
it is the first three categories of information which have been stressed by the Commission in its prospectus requirements. Indeed, the Commission has gone beyond
the statutory requirements as to statements of earnings. It requires a summary of
earnings of at least five years as against the statutory requirement for a three-year
statement of earnings. And the Commission has in its forms substantially increased disclosure requirements as to the history, development and characteristics
of an issuer's business beyond the mere "statement of the general character of the
business actually transacted or to be transacted by the issuer" which Schedule A
requires. Information is presently required in prospectuses concerning the different
kinds of services or products manufactured by the issuer and their contributions to
gross sales. In addition, information is required as to the general competitive conditions in the industry in which the company and its subsidiaries are engaged and the
position of the company and each of its important divisions in the industry of which
they are a part. In essence, what the Commission is requiring presently is a
description of the business of the company and the development of such business
during the five-year period of the summary of earnings included in the prospectus,
with a view to showing primarily the risk factors in the business as indicated by its
development and the course of its sales and earnings (frequently by divisions of its
business) during such five-year period.
Generally speaking, in the case of only one type of security offered to the general
public has the Commission varied its registration and prospectus requirements
under the Securities Act from the principles set forth by Speaker Rayburn. In
1954 the Commission promulgated Form S-9 for registration under the Securities Act
of non-convertible, fixed interest, non-subordinated debt securities of domestic issuers
which have been engaged in substantially the same general business for at least the
last ten years preceding the filing of the registration statement. The issuer is
required to have a very substantial degree of interest coverage both before and
after the issuance of the proposed securities and must be a company which has
been filing reports with the Commission pursuant to the requirements of the Securi8SSee Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, x6 Bus. LAw. 300
(1961), for an elaboration of this thesis.
. Although information on the remuneration of officers and directors and their material transactions
with the company may be of some significance in making an investment judgment concerning a
security, information as to the names and participations of underwriters is primarily important to disclose
those who will be liable as underwriters under § ii and r2 of the Securities Act. Information as
to underwriting commissions is of little analytical significance unless such commissions are so gross in
character as to warrant action by disciplinary authorities. The prime function of the investor is to
weigh the price which he is asked to pay for the security offered to him against the earnings prospects
of the security revealed by the information in Categories A, B, and C.

INTEGRATION OF TH

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

773

ties Exchange Act. The registration form requires information only as to selling
commissions, use of proceeds, summary of earnings and surplus, a description
of the securities being registered, and balance sheets and other financial schedules.
This is all the material required to be included in the prospectus. The names of the
underwriters and information concerning the expenses of issuance and distribution
is required to be included only in the registration statement.
Neither the prospectus nor the registration statement expressly provide for a
disclosure of the business of the company of the character generally required in the
general forms of registration statements promulgated by the Commission. The
Special Study's "short-form" proposal would also omit this requirement. However,
the item in Form S- 9 requiring a summary of earnings contains a statement
requiring the prospectus "whenever necessary, [to] reflect information or explanations of material significance to investors in appraising the results shown" in the
summary of earnings. In addition, the same item also contains a provision requiring
a statement of the products or services which constitute the principal source of
sales or revenues, and a statement of gross property additions and retirements for
the period covered by the summary of earnings. In the case of an extractive enterprise, appropriate information as to reserves must be set forth.
As a consequence of these requirements the financial bar invariably inserts in
prospectuses a description of the business in the same style and content as would
be required under the Commission's general forms of registration. 7 In sum,
although Form S-9 and its prospectus requirements are theoretically "short-form,"
in actual practice prospectuses issued in compliance with the form contain all of the
information which would be required for registration of an equity security under
the Securities Act except the information in Categories D and E (other than commissions).
Form S-9 should not be regarded as a model for short-form prospectuses in
general. This form relates only to senior securities with high interest coverages
issued by companies, primarily utility-operating companies, in which self-dealing by
directors and officers is usually non-existent because of the extensive regulations of
such companies by state authorities. In such companies remuneration to officers
and directors is of little importance in the light of the high-interest coverages required
as a condition to the use of the form. Moreover, the form deals with securities sold
almost entirely to institutional investors who are quite capable of ascertaining and
examining the information on file with the Commission with respect to other
categories of information not included in the registration statement."8
" The Form S- 9

registration statement of Sprague Electric Company, Registration No. 2-21634
Form S-9 has been used predominantly by utility and telephone companies. In
this type of company the information in Categories D and E is of little importance, since the companies
are regulated and stock options and other incentive compensation and profit-sharing plans are comparatively rare or, in any event, must be submitted for approval to a state regulatory body. Moreover, the
securities of these companies are increasingly sold by way of competitive bidding and underwriting
commissions tend to be extremely small.
" In addition to Form S-9 the Commission has promulgated another short-form registration

(1963), is typical.
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The Special Study's case for short-form registration statements and prospectuses
in the case of reporting companies rests in large part on the notion that securities
of these companies are traded on exchanges and over-the-counter daily on the basis
of the filed information, without any formal delivery of written information to investors. Because of this fact the Special Study argues that justification can be found
for shortening informal requirements when securities emanate from the company
or its controlling persons and are sold in large blocks to investors in an organized
campaign of offering.
The Special Study's proposition, however, ignores the fact that issuance of new
securities by a company in effect represents a reconstitution and a renewal of its
business. And sales by controlling shareholders in themselves suggest a need for
re-examination and current information concerning the enterprise whose securities
the controlling persons propose to sell to the public." In addition, as already instatement known as Form S-8. This form is restricted solely to the registration of employee stock
purchase plans in which substantial contributions are made by the employer in cash, securities, or other
substantial benefits, and to restricted stock option plans as defined in § 421(d) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. The only information required by the form concerns the plan and the securities subject
to the plan, and the eligibility and extent of participation by employees. Some information about
the stock being issued is also required; however, such information is much less than that required
on Form S-i. Form S-8 requires a summary of earnings of the company for the last five fiscal years
and a statement of the range of market prices of the security being offered for the same period. It
also requires a description of any bankruptcy, receivership or any material reorganization, capital readjustment, or other significant fact concerning the company or any significant subsidiary otherwise
than in the ordinary course of business. The description of the stock being registered is also required.
Finally, certified financial statements of the company for its last fiscal year must be included. The
use of Form S-8 is restricted to companies reporting to the Commission pursuant to the requirements
of §§ 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act and all the information in the registration statement
must be included in the prospectus.
The short-form character of the information required in Form S-8 is undoubtedly justified by the fact
that since the employer must make a substantial contribution to the plan, the employees are obtaining a
bargain purchase of the securities offered or by the fact that the employees will receive options which they
can exercise or not exercise, depending upon the profit they can realize upon exercise. Significantly, however, the form provides that if, in the case of stock option plans, there is to be a reoffering of stock
acquired pursuant to options by persons who would be underwriters under the statute (for example, if the
stock were acquired with a view to distribution), the form must be amended prior to any public offering
to provide all the information required by Form S-i unless the stock is to be offered on a national securities
exchange. By not requiring an amendment, in the case of "regular way" offerings on an exchange, the
Commission indicates clearly its belief that "regular way" trading at ordinary commissions would not involve aggressive selling of the character which would make necessary the presentation of information
directly to investors. On the other hand, however, it is difficult to distinguish sales by those who exercise
options and who are underwriters from sales by controlling persons which must be registered even if
"regular way" sales are all that is contemplated. Because of the unique and specific character of Form S-8,
it would not seem to provide a model for a general form of short-form prospectus.
" The Special Study would require a prospectus disclosure of the reasons for the public offering of
their own securities by controlling shareholders. No such requirement appears in the Securities Act and
the present practice of the Commission is to obtain such reasons as supplemental information for the
use of the Commission's staff. The staff further requires the supplemental statement of reasons for the
proposed sale to include a representation that the selling stockholders are familiar with the registration
statement and also requires that there be set forth any material adverse information known to the
selling security holder with regard to current and prospective operation of the registering company not
disclosed in the prospectus (or a negative representation to such effect, if applicable). See Guides
for Preparation and Filing of Registration Statements 27, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666, Feb.
7, 1964. The prevailing practice seems more desirable and practicable than the Special Study's proposed
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dicated, the absence of a strong bias which is attendant upon ordinary trading in outstanding securities by brokers and dealers is not present when a large block of
securities emanating from the company or its controlling persons is being distributed
on an organized basis to investors. In such circumstances no clear reason can be
seen for depriving the investor of the information which is presently required to be
included in registration statements and prospectuses.
The Special Study's proposal would require information in all categories which
have been set forth above except a description of the business in terms of its risks,
and the salaries and other remuneration of officers, directors and controlling stockholders, option plans and insider transactions. Under the Special Study's proposal,
these categories of information presumably would be left for the underwriters and
dealers to impart to investors. However, examination of current registration statements and prospectuses makes it clear that these categories of information do not
in most cases occupy a great portion of the prospectus and that the omission of this
information will not greatly shorten a prospectus. Since both the Congress and the
Commission have normally taken the view that this information is essential, particularly in the sale of equity securities to investors, it is difficult to see how the "shortening" of the form of registration statement and prospectus by the omission of these
items of information contributes anything of value to the administration of the
securities laws and the protection of investors. Indeed, if disclosure of this information requires a large amount of space, the likelihood is that such information is very
material. Stock option and profit-sharing plans which entail the possibility of a
substantial dilution of the equity of investors should certainly be required to be
disclosed together with their dilution potential. Only in cases where earnings are
so substantial that option plans and profit-sharing plans can have little dilution
effect can their omission be justified.
However, in cases of an unregistered distribution concerning which, as outlined
above, it is suggested that a Commission rule should be promulgated requiring
information concerning the issuer and its securities to be physically conveyed to
investors, reasons of expediency and economy suggest a somewhat different treatment. Certainly the indispensable information concerning the company's earnings,
business (and the risks which may be inherent in the business), and a description of
the rights of the securities offered in relation to the rights of all outstanding securities,
must be supplied. Perhaps, however, information concerning remuneration, option
and profit-sharing plans should not be required to be disclosed in cases of unregistered distributions if the issuer has net assets as disclosed by its latest balance
sheet of at least $5,oo0,000, has been engaged for the preceding three years in substantially the same business, and has earned at least $S5OOOO for at least its last three

fiscal years. Such an exemption would square with the standards of the Commission's
treatment. The Special Study's proposal will probably produce nothing more than statements concerning
the necessity to pay estate taxes or the need to diversify the shareholders' assets.
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present rule for the use of "summary prospectuses."7 ° In the case of unregistered
distributions of outstanding securities of issuers meeting these standards, the essential
capitalization and business of the company remains unchanged and the effect of
insider self-dealing, remuneration and profit-sharing plans have already been felt
and reflected in the company's earnings. Information as to stock options, however,
should be included, albeit briefly, in connection with the description of the company's capitalization if the stock subject to the options does not exceed five per cent
of the outstanding shares. If the stock options relate to a greater amount of shares,
information should be given as to the effects of the possible exercise of the option
upon the outstanding shares.71
CONCLUSION

The general objective of the Special Study to require dissemination of information in the case of distributions which involve a solicitation of investors stimulated
by extra compensation to salesmen or extraordinary profits to owners of the securities
is to be commended. Indeed, this objective has been foreshadowed by Commission
decisions in broker-dealer disciplinary proceedings. However, experience teaches
that neither the industry nor the Commission particularly would or should tolerate
short-form information which omits material and important categories of disclosure
necessary inthe light of the nature of the security and the purpose of the offering.
The fact that information is on file concerning companies should not provide a
reason for eliminating elements of information deemed vital by law for disclosure
to investors. The essential goal of the securities laws-to place in the hands of
investors offered securities a compendium of information necessary to enable them
to make an adequate security analysis without the necessity of further inquiry or
examination or information stored elsewhere-should not be sacrificed on the altar
of short-form expediency.
"oRule 4 3 4 A of the General Rules and Regulations Under the Securities Act, 17 C.F.R. §230.434A
(Curn. Supp. 1963).

" For the type of disclosure presently required in the case of stock option plans which involve a high
potential dilution of the equity of existing shares, see Guides for Preparation and Filing of Registration
Statements 5, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4666, Feb. 7, 1964.

